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GOV.UK Verify: Federated, privacy focussed identity 
assurance 
Internationally, there is a major push towards enhancing national identity systems 
through the use of digital technologies, in poor countries as much as in rich ones 
(Bernat 2011; Romero 2012).  There are various policy drivers behind these initiatives, 
including improving control over access to various public goods and services, taxation 
and economic development as well as concerns over national security.  Recent 
advances in digital technologies enable consideration of policy options that were 
infeasible a decade ago especially in countries where paper documentation and civil 
registration systems have been weak (Whitley and Hosein 2010; World Bank 2016). 
At the same time, digital identity systems introduce both privacy risks (Nyst et al. 
2016a) and technological solutions that can mitigate them (Nyst et al. 2016b).  Whilst 
many privacy enhancing identity systems have been proposed, few have been 
implemented successfully at the national level.  GOV.UK Verify is an exception and 
this piece reviews how Verify operates, explaining how privacy protection is 
embedded within Verify.  It ends with consideration of the lessons that can be learned 
from Verify for other contexts. 
Introducing GOV.UK Verify 
Since the British government scrapped proposals for a biometric identity card based 
around a centralised National Identity Register in 2010 (Whitley 2014), it has spent the 
last five years developing a federated, privacy focussed alternative approach to 
identity assurance.  GOV.UK Verify has been a “live” service since late May 2016.  
There have been over 750,000 user signins, accessing a range of online government 
services, since the beta version of the service was launched in December 2014.  Online 
services that can be accessed through Verify include checking state pensions, claiming 
for a redundancy payment and filing self–assessment tax returns.  Further services are 
being added regularly. 
GOV.UK Verify emerged from a political climate that eschewed any notion of a 
centralised identity database or anything that might be seen as a proxy National 
Identity Register.  Verify is explicitly focused on addressing user needs and applies 
privacy–by–design to the technical architecture as well as the procurement and 
governance of the service.  As a result GOV.UK Verify operates using a federated 
model involving (only) private sector identity providers.  These companies undertake 
the identity proofing and verification of individuals to government defined standards.  
They also provide secure authentication methods for users.  The Verify model means 




Using GOV.UK Verify 
The first time someone wishes to access an online government service using Verify, 
they are redirected to the Verify “Hub” which acts as an intermediary between the 
companies acting as identity providers and the online government service.  The Hub 
helps the user choose which, of a number of companies, are best suited to helping 
them obtain a Verify’d identity.  Eight companies (Barclays, CitizenSafe, Digidentity, 
Experian, Post Office, Royal Mail, SecureIdentity and Verizon) are currently certified 
to work with Verify.  The certified company the user chooses then takes them through 
an identity proofing and verification process (described in more detail below) which, 
if successful, will give them a Verify’d identity that achieves Level of Assurance 2.  
LoA2 has been determined as addressing the risk profile required to access most 
government online services.  A user returning to a Verify enabled government service 
doesn’t need to undertake the identity proofing and verification process again, instead 
they simply authenticate themselves at the certified company before proceeding. 
Although the identity proofing and verification process may gather data about 
various aspects of the individual, only a small amount of this data is retained.  Using 
a Verify’d identity to access an online government service involves the certified 
company sending a (minimal) matching data set, that consists of full name, address, 
date of birth, (optionally) gender, history of attributes and associated level of 
assurance (i.e. LoA2), in encrypted form, to the Hub where it is then passed, in 
encrypted form, to the government service.  The Hub therefore ensures that the 
certified company does not know which government service is being used and vice 
versa.  The matching data set is compared to similar data held by the government 
service and a matching process means the user is then able to interact with their details 
held by the government service provider.  Annex 1 summarises the data flows 
associated with using Verify. 
Verify’s approach to Identity proofing and verification 
Verify is not intended to provide a “gold standard of identification” that relies on a 
single, definitive (and hackable (Leyden 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Thomson 2015)) register 
of personal data, rather Verify operates on the basis of four levels of identity proofing 
assurance each of which provide an increasing level of confidence that the applicant’s 
claimed identity is their real identity (GOV.UK 2014, chap. 2).  Level of assurance 2 
(LoA2), used for most government services, “is a Claimed Identity with evidence that 
supports the real world existence and activity of that identity.  The steps taken to 
determine that the identity relates to a real person and that the Applicant is owner of 
that identity might be offered in support of civil proceedings”. 
The identity proofing and verification process “should enable a legitimate 
individual to prove their identity in a straightforward manner whilst creating 
significant barriers to those trying to claim to be somebody they are not”.  The 
individual presents evidence to support their identity claims and the evidence needs 
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to be confirmed as being “Valid and / or Genuine and belonging to the individual”.  
This includes checking whether the identity exists in the real world and, importantly, 
“breadth and depth of evidence and checking required shall differ depending on the 
level of assurance needed in that the identity is real and belongs to the individual”. 
This means that the identity proofing process does not rely on possession of a 
single breeder document, such as a birth certificate or passport.  Instead, the 
individual provides access to an “identity evidence package” that includes evidence 
that can be categorised into three broad categories: Citizen, Money and Living 
(GOV.UK Verify 2014a).  The overall identity “score”, therefore, includes 
consideration of the strength of the identity evidence presented, the outcome of 
attempts to validate the identity evidence, the outcome of the identity verification, the 
outcome of active counter–fraud checks and the strength of activity history evidence 
(i.e. existence in the real world over a period of time). 
Examples of identity evidence that can be used include a police bail sheet, which 
has a low score relating to the living category, a bank account which has a high score 
for the money category and an ICAO 9303 compliant e-passports with basic or 
enhanced access control which has a very high score for the living category.  Identity 
proofing and verification does not end once an identity has been Verify’d.  Instead, 
there is an obligation on the certified companies to undertake periodic checks after the 
registration has taken place as well as checks “every time a user signs into a service”.  
These checks include things like repeating the counter–fraud check periodically or 
ensuring that verification of an address is not older than a set number of days. 
By having private sector certified companies undertaking the identity proofing 
and verification process and only paying them for the successful creation of a Verify’d 
identity, Verify encourages innovation in the marketplace by allowing the companies 
to explore different forms of identity evidence that might enable particular segments 
of society (e.g. young people, older people, farmers, non–nationals) to obtain a 
Verify’d identity. 
Embedding privacy in Verify 
A report written by Sir James Crosby (2008), about the previous identity cards scheme, 
highlighted the role of citizen needs and privacy in any successful identity system.  
His report proved highly influential in shaping the Verify approach (including the 
technical architecture described above).  In his report, Crosby chose to differentiate 
between identity management which “is designed to benefit the holder of the 
information” and identity assurance, which “is focused on bringing benefits to the 
consumer”, arguing that the distinction between the two is “fundamental” (para. 1.6).  
“As a result”, he continued, “although the technology employed to achieve [identity] 
assurance and management may be similar, the end design of the system is likely to 
be very different.  An [identity] assurance scheme built primarily to deliver high levels 
of assurance for consumers will address issues, such as the amount and type of data 
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stored and the degree to which this information is shared, differently to one inspired 
mainly by the needs of its owners” (para. 1.7). 
In order to properly address the privacy and consumer concerns around identity 
assurance identified by Sir James Crosby, in 2011 the Cabinet Office created the 
Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG) (GOV.UK Verify 2016a) which held 
its first meeting on 2 August 2011.  According to its terms of reference (GOV.UK Verify 
2015), “PCAG is a forum that provides an independent view on issues involving 
privacy and wider consumer concerns” on a “variety of initiatives with implications 
for individuals regarding the use of their personal data and their privacy”.  These 
range from “the identity assurance programme to the use of patient records in the 
NHS, to interdepartmental data sharing and anti–fraud initiatives”.  Membership of 
the group includes academics, privacy advocates, consumer groups and others with 
specialist expertise in the area.  It meets monthly and the minutes of its meeting are 
published online. 
PCAG has developed (and consulted on) a set of Identity Assurance principles for 
Verify.  They are explicitly presented using the first–person and active voice to 
reinforce the role of the citizen at the centre of the process: 
 
1. User Control I can exercise control over identity 
assurance activities affecting me and 
these can only take place if I consent or 
approve them 
2. Transparency Identity assurance can only take place in 
ways I understand and when I am fully 
informed 
3. Multiplicity I can use and choose as many different 
identifiers or identity providers as I 
want to 
4. Data minimisation My interactions only use the minimum 
data necessary to meet my needs 
5. Data quality I choose when to update my records 
6. Service User Access and 
Portability 
I have to be provided with copies of all 
of my data on request; I can move / 
remove my data whenever I want 
7. Certification I can have confidence in the 
Identity Assurance Service because all 
the participants have to be certified 
against common 
governance requirements 
8. Dispute resolution If I have a dispute, I can go to an 
independent Third Party for a 
resolution   
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9. Exceptional circumstances I know that any exception has to be 
approved by Parliament and is subject 
to independent scrutiny   
 
The identity assurance principles were incorporated in the procurement process 
with certified companies needing to outline “the steps the Provider, its Affiliates and 
Provider Personnel have taken to comply with the provisions in the Identity 
Assurance Principles which are applicable to such parties; and (ii) any measures they 
plan to implement in future” and whilst they are not one of the mandatory compliance 
requirements have been reviewed as part of the Verify privacy assessment (GOV.UK 
Verify 2016b). 
Private sector use of Verify’d identities 
From the earliest days of Verify, the programme team has engaged with the private 
sector, not simply to support identity proofing and the verification process or to 
become an identity provider.  Rather the engagement has been based on the premise 
that possessing a Verify’d identity that was “good enough for government” could be 
transferred to commercial transactions as well and would offer additional benefits to 
citizens and companies alike (UKAuthority.com 2016). 
In order to explore these possibilities, in 2012 the Verify team became a founder 
member of OIXUK – the UK chapter of the Open Identity eXchange.  OIXUK a non–
profit, technology agnostic, collaborative cross sector membership organisation with 
the purpose of accelerating the adoption of digital identity services based on open 
standards. 
Verify uses OIXUK “to communicate with the marketplace for identity assurance 
supply and to support experimental alpha and discovery projects that explore the real 
world business, design and technical challenges that will shape the adoption of digital 
identity services based on open standards”.  A number of OIXUK discovery projects 
have been undertaken.  Resulting white papers are available on the OIXUK website 
(OIXUK 2016a). 
For example, recent OIX reports explore the possible use of Verify’d identities for 
the peer–to–peer economy, for creating a pensions dashboard, to transform attitudes 
and behaviours towards savings, to open a bank account and undertake financial 
transactions in another country, as well as opening an account in the UK before 
arriving (GOV.UK Verify 2016c) and digital “blue badges” which enable special 
parking allowances for individuals with mobility issues. 
In each case, consideration of privacy issues has been an integral part of the 
process and a recent study of OIXUK members reports that there was a high level of 
awareness of the principles amongst respondents, with 78% feeling that having a set 
of privacy principles was very important to a cross industry identity approach and a 
similar proportion feeling that the privacy principles were very relevant to their sector 
or organisations (OIXUK 2016b). 
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Learning from Verify 
Although Verify exists in a very specific context and brings together a number of 
different features, there are lessons that can be learned for any country seeking to 
develop or renew its identity scheme in order to make it more privacy enhancing.  
Moreover, although the combination of all these features provides very strong privacy 
protections, privacy gains can be achieved without implementing all the features of 
Verify. 
Verify’s technical architecture, with a central Hub, encrypted transactions and a 
minimal matching data set is a key privacy enhancing feature.  This is complemented 
by the adoption of a federated approach involving multiple certified companies as 
identity providers. 
Verify’s tiered approach to identity proofing and verification avoids unnecessary 
data collection.  Moreover, the Verify–once, use–many philosophy further reduces 
privacy risks by avoiding inconsistent identity evidence requirements from different 
government services, unnecessary identity data duplication etc.  Thinking of identity 
in terms of level of assurance also encourages innovation in the market place whereby 
certified companies have an incentive to support as diverse a range of users as 
possible, including non–nationals and those with complex lives, as well as developing 
new, secure authentication methods (Ashford 2015). 
The Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group plays an important role in the 
governance of Verify.  Alongside the development of the identity assurance principles 
that are now part of the contractual relationship with the certified companies, PCAG 
also provides an effective, independent sounding board for the Verify team to discuss 
developments and proposals that might affect public trust and confidence in the 
service.  Alongside the work of PCAG, Verify has undertaken a series of privacy 
impact assessments and published them (GOV.UK Verify 2016b). 
More generally, Verify is very open about its work, blogging actively (GOV.UK 
Verify 2016d), making much of its software open source (GOV.UK Verify 2014b) and 
publishing many of its standards and guidelines (GOV.UK Verify 2013, 2014c, 2016e). 
The Verify experience demonstrates that it is possible to design privacy friendly 
systems at scale that support user needs and address service provider concerns 
(Whitley 2015). 
Annex Data flows in Verify 
Figure 1 presents the data flows associated with Verify, starting with the user 
connecting to the Government service provider (1), being redirected to Verify (2) 
where they are asked to either pick a certified company to obtain a Verify’d identity 
from (or to choose a certified company they previously have a Verify’d identity 
account with) (3, 4).  The user is then redirected to the certified company (5) and there 
either undertakes the identity proofing and verification checks (6, 7) or authenticates 
themselves (6, 7).  Once this is done, the user is returned to Verify (8) and, from there, 
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on to the Government service provider (9) which thereafter interacts with the user 
(10). 
 
Figure 1 Data flows in Verify 
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